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“The only mistake we made with Katrina
was not overriding the local government.”1
Karl Rove, White House Deputy Chief of Staff
“I am going to need all the help you can send me.”2
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, Louisiana, to President Bush
INTRODUCTION
The recent devastation and destruction by Hurricane Katrina in August
2005 in the Gulf Coast exemplifies the critical need for better federal, state,
and local government coordination during a catastrophic public health
emergency. Relying on only one or two of these governmental entities, or
an uncoordinated response by all three, to spearhead disaster relief on a
national scale only exacerbates the disaster, costing thousands of lives and
billions of dollars.
Criticism of the federal response to Katrina, especially that of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) was widespread.3 In the immediate wake of
Katrina, President Bush promised a “swifter federalization of response
operations and deployment of military forces” in future catastrophes,4
including a greater readiness to have the federal government take charge of
the state and local responses during similar future crises of national

1. Rove Off the Record on Katrina: The Only Mistake We Made Was Not Overriding
the
Local
Government,
THE
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Sept.
17,
2005,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2005/09/17/rove-off-the-record-on-ka_n_7513.html.
2. Eric Lipton, et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1, at 11 (quoting Governor Blanco as telling President Bush “I
need everything you’ve got . . . I am going to need all the help you can send me”).
3. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Scott Shane, Leader of Federal Effort Feels the Heat, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A17 (noting the “remarkable confession” of Michael D. Brown,
former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who had only just
learned of the three-day plight of thousands of citizens without food or water at the New
Orleans convention center). On September 12, Michael Brown resigned as Director of
FEMA amid heavy criticism of FEMA’s response to the effects of Hurricane Katrina. See
Richard W. Stevenson, After Days of Criticism, Emergency Director Resigns, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A26; see also Jennifer Steinhauer & Eric Lipton, FEMA, Slow to the
Rescue, Now Stumbles in Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A1 (“Nearly three weeks
after Hurricane Katrina cut its devastating path, FEMA . . . is faltering in its effort to aid
hundreds of thousands of storms victims” and “serious problems remain throughout the
affected region.”); FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 69 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf [hereinafter TOWNSEND]
(“. . . [T]he Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the energy and
professionalism of DHS personnel was not enough to support the Department’s role as the
manager of the Federal response.”).
4. Chris Strohm, Officials Consider Quicker Federalization, Use of Military in
Disaster
Response,
GOVEXEC.COM,
Sept.
20,
2005,
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0905/092005c1.htm.
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proportion.5
Indeed, the White House February 2006 self-evaluation of its Katrina
response, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,
included recommendations to be implemented by June 1, 2006 (the first
day of the 2006 hurricane season) involving increased military involvement
in hurricane response.6 Accordingly, state and local emergency response
planners need to be ever more mindful and aware of the role and power of
the federal government in disaster response, and the interaction among
federal, state, and local laws and regulations in these emergencies.
To be sure, state or local governments zealously guard what they view as
their prerogative of playing the primary role in emergency response. For
example, just days after President Bush’s post-Katrina proposal to increase
the federal role in responding to national catastrophes, the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the National Governor’s Association,7 Governor Mike
Huckabee (R-Ark.)8 and Governor Janet Napolitano (D-Ariz.)
respectively,9 sharply criticized the notion of federal preemption of “the
constitutional authority of states and the nation’s governors during an
emergency,” contending that “[s]tate and local governments are in the best
position to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disaster and
emergency.”10
Moreover, Representative Peter T. King (R-NY), Chairman of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, backed the governors by arguing that
5. Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address
to
the
Nation
(Sept.
15,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.
6. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The Federal Response to
Hurricane
Katrina:
Lessons
Learned
(Feb.
23,
2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060223.html [hereinafter Lessons
Learned] (summarizing the federal government’s planned response to Hurricane Katrina).
Upon establishment of a Federal Joint Field Office (JFO), a Department of Defense (DOD)
point of contact must be present “at the JFO and FEMA regional offices to enhance
coordination of military resources supporting the [hurricane] response.” Id. Additionally,
locations must be designated “throughout the country for receiving, staging, moving, and
integrating military resources to ensure the most effective deployment of Federal disaster
relief personnel and assets.” Id.
7. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION 2005-2006 Committees (Mar. 13, 2006),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/COMMITTEELIST.pdf.
8. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, Governor’s Information Arkansas Governor
Mike
Huckabee,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.29fab9fb4add37305ddcbeeb501010a0/?vgnex
toid=3026ae3effb81010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD (last visited June 26, 2006).
9. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, Governor’s Information Arizona Governor
Janet
Napolitano,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.29fab9fb4add37305ddcbeeb501010a0/?vgnex
toid=d008224971c81010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD (last visited June 26, 2006).
10. Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and Responsibilities of
Local, State, and Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security,
109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/files/TestimonyNapolitano.pdf.
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the existence of “constitutional, legal, and practical constraints on the
[f]ederal government’s ability to preempt the local and [s]tate role in
responding to disasters and emergencies,” shows that “local and [s]tate
governments–and not the Feds–are primarily responsible for responding to
natural disasters and other emergencies.”11
However, some at the local level continue to support a strong federal role
in this area. In October 2005, for example, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
met with DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, requesting greater active
military involvement in the immediate response to a catastrophic event.12
Similarly, George Annas, a leading public health law expert at Boston
University Law School, advocates that if a national plan codifying public
health emergency policy should be created, it should be at the federal level,
not the state.13 In some ways, Professor Annas’ call for a federal plan was
answered in the National Response Plan (NRP),14 which provides for
federal coordination of federal, state, and local responsibilities in
addressing a public health crisis amounting to an “incident of national
significance.”15
I. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
The central role of the states in responding to public health emergencies
was confirmed by the promulgation of the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act (hereinafter, “the Model Act”).16 In October 2001,17 officials
11. Press Release, Comm. on Homeland Security, Statement by Chairman Peter T.
King, Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and Responsibilities of
Local, State, and Federal Authorities 2 (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/files/KingOpeningStatement10192005.pdf.
12. See Press Release, The United States Conference of Mayors, The U.S. Conference
of Mayors Hold Special Meeting on Emergency Response and Homeland Security, Update
“National Action Plan for Safety in America’s Cities” (Oct. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/documents/HomelandSecurityRelease_
102405.pdf.
13. See George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human Rights, 21 HEALTH
AFF. 94, 95 (2002).
14. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN iii (Dec. 2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf [hereinafter NRP].
15. An “incident of national significance” is “an actual or potential high-impact event
that requires a coordinated and effective response by and appropriate combination of
[f]ederal, [s]tate, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to
save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery
and mitigation activities.” Id. at 67.
16. See THE CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVS., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf [hereinafter MODEL
ACT].
17. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act – A Brief Commentary, at 3, Jan. 2002, available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/Center%20MSEHPA%20Commentary.pdf.
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at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in collaboration
with organizations representing states and localities, requested the
development of a more effective legal structure to respond to catastrophic
public health emergencies.18 The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown University and the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, under contract to the CDC, responded with the Model Act,
published in its current form on December 21, 2001.19
Under the Model Act, once a governor has declared a state of public
health emergency, the governor and the state’s public health authority have
extraordinarily broad powers over public health emergency response.20 A
governor may make such a declaration with no outside consultation, and
only a majority vote in both chambers of the state legislature can terminate
the declaration against the governor’s wishes.21 Once declared, the
governor’s authority includes suspending many state laws, directing all
state resources toward emergency response, and mobilizing the state
militia.22
The state’s public health authority “coordinate[s] all matters pertaining
to the public health emergency response.”23 The public health authority
may access and take control of any facilities and/or property and perform
medical examinations and testing, including vaccination.24 Any person
refusing compliance with gubernatorial directives may be isolated or
quarantined, which the public health authority may compel with criminal
sanctions.25 The Model Act’s proposed establishment of sweeping state
powers have sparked serious and widespread debate, particularly with
regard to civil liberties.26 Based on these concerns, some states, such as
18. See Lawrence O. Gostin, et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases,
288
JAMA
622,
622
(2002),
available
at
http://jama.amaassn.org/cgi/content/full/288/5/622.
19. See MODEL ACT, supra note 16.
20. See id. at art. IV.
21. See id. §§ 401, 405.
22. Id. §§ 403, 404.
23. Id. § 403(b).
24. Id. §§ 502, 505, 602-604.
25. Id. § 604.
26. See generally Larry Copeland, CDC Proposes Bioterrorism Laws, USA TODAY,
Nov. 8, 2001, at 3A (noting concern that the Model Act would give states too much power);
Marcia Coyle, Pushing Tough State Health Laws, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A1 (citing
debate over whether the Model Act encroaches on individual liberties); Deirdre Davidson,
Inadmissible, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at 3 (discussing debate spurred by the Model Act
over states’ power to control people during a health crisis); Alice Keesing, Sweeping Health
Powers Sought, HONOLULU ADVER., Nov. 19, 2001, at 1A (citing civil liberties concerns);
Michael Lasalandra, War On Terrorism; Smallpox Attack Preparedness Plan Would Give
Officials Sweeping Powers, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 8, 2001, at 16 (citing civil liberties
concerns); Raja Mishra & Beth Daley, New Bill Targets Disease Spread Plan Raises Issue
of Quarantining, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2001, at B7 (questioning the effectiveness of
quarantine at countering epidemics); Wendy E. Parmet & Wendy K. Mariner, A Health Act
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California, refused to consider the Model Act.27 Although there continues
to be substantial debate within the public health community about the
model legislation, the Center for Law and the Public’s Health states that (as
of this writing) thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have passed
bills or resolutions that include provisions from or are closely related to the
Model Act.28 Some scholars dispute these numbers, claiming that the
drafters of the Model Act “grossly overstate their support” and use
“language of salespeople, not legal scholars.”29 However, it cannot be
disputed that the Model Act has focused debate on the primacy of the states
in emergency response.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE MODEL ACT
Quoting the Supreme Court’s 1824 decision in Gibbons v. Ogden,30 a
drafter of the Model Act contended upon its promulgation that “states have
a deep reservoir of public health powers [encompassing an] immense mass
of legislation [including] ‘inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws
of every description.’”31 Because of Gibbons, the drafters asserted that the
“power to act to preserve the public’s health is constitutionally reserved
primarily to the states as an exercise of their police powers.”32
Yet, as other scholars have convincingly demonstrated,33 even Chief
Justice Marshall’s statements in Gibbons in 1824 suggest a “more complex
relationship” between Congress’ power and state power over public
health,34 i.e., that Gibbons does not propose that states have exclusive or
dominant power over health, but instead “that the power to protect the
public health is an inherent and undeniable aspect of sovereignty that states
That Jeopardizes Public Health, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2001, at A15 (questioning the
necessity and wisdom of the Model Act); Nancy Shute, Germs and Guns, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 19, 2001, at 50 (questioning whether a quarantine would be enforceable
and be able to control an epidemic in modern times).
27. George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st
Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 60 (2003) [hereinafter Blinded].
28. THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVS., MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS
ACT,
LEGISLATIVE
STATUS
UPDATE,
Feb.
1,
2006,
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm#MSEHPA.
29. See Blinded, supra note 27 (discussing inconsistencies in the number of states
adopting a complete version of the Model Act). Some state legislatures adopted only select
provisions of the Model Act, while others adopt a more complete version. Id.
30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
31. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public
Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 24 (2003) (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203) [hereinafter Public Health and Civil Liberties].
32. Gostin, et al., supra note 18, at 622.
33. See Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201-02 (2002) (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s statements
in Gibbons v. Ogden).
34. Id. at 202.

58-3 - GREENBERGER DESKTOPPED

12/11/2006 3:56:49 PM

2006]GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES

7

may exercise unless and until Congress preempts that power by exercising
one of its own enumerated powers.”35
The jurisprudence emanating from United States v. Lopez36 and United
States v. Morrison37 also influenced the Model Act drafters. In these cases,
the Supreme Court held, respectively, that regulating the possession of
firearms near school zones and enacting the civil remedy provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)38 were not within Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause.39 Citing Lopez, for example, one of the
Model Act drafters argued that the “Supreme Court . . . has regarded
federal police powers as constitutionally limited, and has curtailed the
expansion of national public health authority.”40
Yet, even Lopez and Morrison define commerce broadly as “includ[ing]
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.”41 The Court in both Lopez and Morrison maintained that
where “activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.”42 Local gun sales and
enforcement of the VAWA may not have been considered commerce, but
legislation regulating catastrophic public health emergencies with
nationwide implications (such as Katrina) self-evidently affects economic
activity which certainly affects interstate commerce.
A more recent Commerce Clause case decided after promulgation of the
Model Act, strongly suggests that catastrophic public health issues will
almost always be deemed as “substantially affect[ing] interstate
commerce.” In Gonzales v. Raich,43 the Court held that Congress’
Commerce Clause power includes the “power to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.”44 The
two respondents in Raich, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, used medical
marijuana pursuant to the terms of the California Compassionate Use Act
35. Id.
36. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (construing the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)).
39. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (holding that regulating firearms near school zones
“exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause authority”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (holding that
“Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact [VAWA’s] civil remedy”); see also
Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional Design, 11
HEALTH MATRIX 265, 289- 91 (2001) (discussing public health and the federal government’s
power under the Commerce Clause).
40. Public Health and Civil Liberties, supra note 31, at 24 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
566-68).
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
42. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
43. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
44. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2199.
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of 1996 (CCUA).45 That legislation “ensure[d] that ‘seriously ill’ residents
of [California] have access to marijuana for medical purposes. . . .”46 After
federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents, relying on the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA),47 seized and destroyed the marijuana
plants in question, both respondents challenged those actions,48 arguing
that the CSA’s prohibition of intrastate manufacture and possession of
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeded
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.49
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that
Congress’ assertion of authority under the Commerce Clause has “evolved
over time,” and even the intrastate growth of marijuana does encompass
interstate commerce. In so holding, the Court affirmed that Congress has
the power to “regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”50
It is difficult to imagine that if the Court finds that the wholly intrastate
growth of marijuana affects interstate commerce and that the Congressional
public health initiative to control substance abuse was an appropriate use of
the Commerce Clause, then the Court would not also conclude that a
massive public health catastrophe, such as Katrina or a pandemic flu, also
substantially affects interstate commerce.
Considering Raich’s confirmation of federal authority over even purely
local economic activities if they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, any catastrophic public health disaster is likely to be considered
subject to Congress’ commerce powers. The recent holding of Raich
should diminish concerns about the ability of the federal government to
45. Id. at 2199-200; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1991 & Supp.
2006)).
46. Id. at 2199 (paraphrasing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1) (West 1991
& Supp. 2006)).
47. Id. at 2200 (construing Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–802, 811–814, 821–830, 841–844a, 846–853, 854–864, 871–881, 882–
887, 889–904 (2005))).
48. Id..
49. Id. at 2204-05.
50. Id. at 2205 (emphasis added) (citing Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)). The Court in Raich stressed in its ruling
that the California Compassionate Use Act fell within the purview of Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause. The word “‘economics,’” used by the Court, refers to “‘the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”
Id. at 2211 (quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). The Court notes that the
Controlled Substances Act regulates a commodity (marijuana) for which there is an
interstate market, and that prohibitions of intrastate possession or manufacture of an article
of commerce is an established means of regulating commerce in that product. Gonzales,
125 S. Ct. at 2211 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2000) (prohibiting the possession, sale, or
transport of bald and golden eagles); 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (2000) (prohibiting biological
weapons); 18 U.S.C. § 831(a) (2000) (prohibiting nuclear material); 18 U.S.C. § 842(n)(1)
(2000) (prohibiting certain plastic explosives); 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a) (2000) (prohibiting
contraband cigarettes)).
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intervene, and if necessary, supervise the response to a catastrophic public
health disaster. While states and localities should universally be looked to
as the first line of defense in public health catastrophes, when those levels
of government are overwhelmed, as they were in Katrina, they must be
aware of the possibility of federal intervention in, and possible takeover of,
disaster relief.
III. THE MODEL ACT AND THE FEDERAL ROLE:
AN EXAMPLE OF OVERLAP
In this regard, a vast array of federal laws and regulations exist that
provide federal authority in areas that overlap with state powers afforded in
the Model Act.51 One important example is the issue of quarantine.52 The
Model Act grants state officials the authority to examine, vaccinate, isolate,
and quarantine individuals who pose a threat to public health.53 Yet
Congress has granted quarantine power to the Surgeon General and
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
“prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases [and they] may provide for such inspection, fumigation,
disinfection, sanitation, [and] destruction of . . . articles.”54 The regulations
implementing this grant of authority provide that the Director of the CDC
may utilize the quarantine authority whenever it is “determine[d] that the
measures taken by health authorities of any [s]tate or possession . . . are
insufficient to prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from
such [s]tate or possession to any other [s]tate or possession.”55
This essentially means that any quarantine measures taken by a state may
51. For a summary of the major federal statutes and regulations involving federal public
health powers, see Topic 7 of the U. OF MD. CTR. FOR HEALTH AND HOMELAND SECURITY,
OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MD. PUB. HEALTH
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LEGAL HANDBOOK 34 (2005), available
at
http://www.umaryland.edu/healthsecurity/docs/Handbook%209-9-05.pdf.
52. See MODEL ACT, supra note 16, at § 604.
53. See id. §§ 602-604; see also id. at §§ 401–405, 501–507, 601–608 (describing all
powers the Governor has during a public health emergency under the Model Act).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2000). This section is the Quarantine and Inspection part of the
General Powers and Duties subchapter of the Public Health Service chapter of the Public
Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–272 (2000). President Bush issued an
executive order to amend the PHSA in 2005 to address “[i]nfluenza caused by novel or
reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.”
Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005).
55. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2005) (defining measures to be taken “in the event of inadequate
local control”). As of this writing, these quarantine regulations are undergoing a highly
controversial proposed expansion that may afford the federal government even greater
quarantine powers than are now available to it. See, e.g., CDC, Control of Communicable
Disease, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70 & 71),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/index.htm; see also Lawrence K. Altman,
C.D.C. Proposes New Rules in Effort to Prevent Disease Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2005,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/health/articlepage.html?res=9802E7DF1631F930A15752C1A9639C8B63 (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
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conflict with or duplicate measures taken by the CDC. It is wellestablished that federal authority will legally preempt state actions,
whenever state legislation, such as legislation patterned after the Model
Act, conflicts with existing federal law.56 The federal laws and regulations
discussed above dealing with quarantine illustrate the possibility of that
preemptory power. To enact or implement state legislation without a
recognition of existing comparable federal law may frustrate the very
purpose of state emergency laws, i.e., to provide comprehensive, direct,
and meaningful guidance for action in a public health emergency.
These potential conflicts are particularly worrisome in light of the
impending possibility of a pandemic influenza outbreak. As do all
nationwide catastrophes, such a pandemic would begin in localities, but
ultimately affect the nation as a whole. In the event of an outbreak,
resources should not be devoted to quibbling over who has quarantine and
isolation authority, but toward coordinated efforts through all levels of
government to address the potential catastrophe.
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND HURRICANE KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina is a prime example of the impact of a catastrophic
public health emergency on interstate commerce.57 In the immediate
aftermath of the hurricane, the destruction sent thousands of victims across
state borders in search of food and shelter and required delivery of relief
workers and supplies from across the nation.58 The extended aftermath
dramatically affected major nationwide industries.59 For example, the
56. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.2 (1st ed. 2004) (explaining the preemption of federal authority
over state authority); NORMAN REDLICH, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
6.09 (3rd ed. 2005) (illustrating congressional conflict and preemption).
57. HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt declared a federal public health emergency on August
31, 2005 for the states of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. Press Release,
Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Delivering Medical Care to Help
Evacuees
and
Victims
(Aug.
31,
2005),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050831.html; see also Associated Press, Before
Katrina, the Economy was Doing Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at C6 (discussing the
prediction by private economists and the Congressional Budget Office that “fallout from the
storm would cause overall economic activity to slow in the second half of this year by onehalf to a full percentage point on an annualized basis”).
58. See James Dao, Off the Map; No Fixed Address, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 41
(discussing “resettling evacuees” from the Gulf Coast who fled to other states after Katrina);
Kirk Johnson, et al., President Visits as New Orleans Sees Some Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2005, at A1 (describing the extent of relief efforts from all over the nation); Robert D.
McFadden & Ralph Blumenthal, Bush Sees Long Recovery for New Orleans; 30,000 Troops
in Largest Relief U.S. Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A1 (illustrating evacuation
attempts for the city of New Orleans as well as New Orleans’s Mayor C. Ray Nagin’s fear
that the hurricane might have killed thousands in his city).
59. See Prices for Energy Futures Soar in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2005, at C2 (“Economists warned that Katrina was likely to leave a deeper mark
on the national economy than previous hurricanes because of its profound disruption to the
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hurricane severely impaired substantial portions of the country’s oil
refineries and curtailed offshore production of oil and gas.60 As a result,
the nation experienced a sharp and immediate spike in gasoline prices.61
Moreover, DHS’ promulgation in December 2004 of the NRP further
suggests that the federal government contemplates a significant role for
itself in disaster response.62 DHS developed the NRP pursuant to the
Homeland Security Act63 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.64
It was intended to be an “all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to
domestic incident management . . . built on the template of the National
Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent
doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels,
regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident.”65 The NRP
provides “mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of a wide
variety of incident management and emergency assistance activities,” such
as “[f]ederal support to [s]tate, local, and tribal authorities; interaction with
nongovernmental, private donor, and private-sector organizations; and the
coordinated, direct exercise of [f]ederal authorities, when appropriate.”66
The NRP strongly suggests that any time the President declares an
emergency under the Stafford Act, it is an “Incident of National
Significance,”67 calling into play broad federal oversight mandated by that
plan. While it is now widely acknowledged that the NRP was triggered
belatedly,68 Secretary Michael Chertoff did finally activate the NRP by
declaring an “Incident of National Significance” as a result of the
Gulf of Mexico’s complex energy supply network.”); see also id. at C4 (“The airline
industry felt the delayed brunt of Hurricane Katrina, with some airports running low on jet
fuel and carriers canceling hundreds more flights.”).
60. Jad Mouawad & Simon Romero, Gas Prices Surge as Supply Drops, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2005, at A1.
61. Some states reached higher gas prices than they had ever experienced pre-Katrina.
See Associated Press, Gasoline Pricing Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 14NJ-6
(“New Jersey’s gasoline prices hit their highest levels ever on Labor Day, averaging $3.16 a
gallon for regular. . . .”); Jad Mouaward, Storm Stretches Refiners Past a Perilous Point,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 27 (“The hurricane also knocked off a dozen refineries at the
peak of summer demand, sending oil prices higher and gasoline prices to inflation-adjusted
records.”); Mouawad & Romero, supra note 60 at A1 (“While gasoline averaged $2.60 a
gallon earlier in the week [of Aug. 29 to Sept. 2], unleaded regular gas was selling [on Aug.
31] at $3.09 at stations in West Palm Beach, Fla.; $3.49 in Indianapolis; and $3.25 in San
Francisco. Premium fuel was going for up to $3.89 a gallon in Chicago.”).
62. See NRP, supra note 14.
63. 6 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
64. See NRP, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing the NRP’s objectives).
65. Id. at i.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4.
68. See generally Editorial, Unprepared, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A30 (providing
critical discussion of the delay in declaring an “incident of national significance”); Spencer
S. Hsu & Steve Hendrix, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Were Like Night and Day, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 2005, at A1 (highlighting differences between delayed response of federal
government after Hurricane Katrina compared to the response for Hurricane Rita).
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destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina.69
The NRP authorizes a strong federal response even without requests for
assistance from the states. It expressly provides that “[s]tandard procedures
regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme
circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of
catastrophic magnitude.”70 The NRP also provides for federal law
enforcement assistance and immediate response authority for
“[i]mminently serious conditions [when] time does not permit approval
from higher headquarters. . . .”71 When this situation exists, the NRP
makes it clear that the Department of Defense (DOD) has authorized local
military commanders and responsible officials from DOD to “take
necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with
the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).”72 Indeed, President Bush recognized this
power under the NRP in his September 15, 2005 speech in Jackson Square,
New Orleans by stating that “a challenge on this scale requires greater
federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces[–]the institution of
our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a
moment’s notice.”73
The NRP also emphasizes the importance of deploying the federal
69. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, United States Government
Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4777.
70. NRP, supra note 14, at 44 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 42.
72. Id. at 43. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000), prohibits the
willful use of the Army or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes. Id. This includes
interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other similar activity; directing traffic; search or
seizure; an arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity. See U.S.N. COMMAND,
FACT
SHEETS,
POSSE
COMITATUS
ACT,
available
at
http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/posse_comitatus.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). The
PCA expressly applies to the Army and Air Force, and Congress has included the Navy and
Marines through the Departments of Defense and Navy regulations. See 10 U.S.C. § 375
(2000) (ordering the Secretary of Defense to prescribe “such regulations . . . to ensure that
any activity [regarding civilian law enforcement] does not include or permit direct
participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search,
seizure, arrest, or other similar activity”); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO.
5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, at 21 (Jan. 15,
1986), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d55255p.pdf. The PCA
does, however, allow the use of the military to “execute the laws” if there is a statutory or a
constitutional basis to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). Therefore, the federal
government may apply military force if it can rely on the express language of federal
statutes authorizing such force or if there is a recognized constitutional basis to do so, such
as the inherent power of the President to act as a Commander-in-Chief. See, e.g.,
Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2000); 10 U.S.C. §§ 372(b), 382 (2000)
(describing emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass
destruction); Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b(c), 5192 (2000) (discussing federal
emergency assistance and utilization of DOD resources); 18 U.S.C. § 831(e) (2000)
(clarifying military assistance in emergency situations involving nuclear materials).
73. Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address
to
the
Nation
(Sept.
15,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.
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National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a coordinated effort by HHS,
DHS, DOD, and the Department of Veteran Affairs.74 The NDMS works
in collaboration with the states and other appropriate public and private
entities in providing medical response, patient evacuation, and definitive
medical care to victims and responders of a public health emergency.75
This federal medical assistance is deployed through Emergency Support
Function Annex #8 (ESF #8), “Public Health and Medical Services,”
within the NRP.76 ESF #8 provides for federally directed medical
assistance to supplement state and local resources in response to an incident
of national significance.77 Katrina, as the first incident of national
significance under the NRP, demonstrated the effectiveness of the NDMS
and ESF #8, even when belatedly deployed.78 For example, NDMS teams
treated over 100,000 patients.79 By September 3, HHS had delivered one
hundred tons of medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile to
Louisiana.80 Despite this success, HHS and FEMA struggled to balance
their respective roles in the deployment of NDMS teams.81 As such,
Lessons Learned suggests a legislative return of NDMS back to HHS,
where it was located prior to the creation of DHS.82
Evidence of the potentially all-encompassing federal role in responding
to a catastrophic public health emergency can be found by looking no
further than the federal assets that were brought to bear–however
belatedly–in the wake of Katrina. Roughly thirty federal departments and
agencies were a part of that response effort.83 This response exemplifies
the vast resources of the federal government and includes everything from
providing food, water, shelter, and first aid to offering immediate income
assistance to displaced workers and supporting the operation and recovery
of national banks in affected areas.84 As an example, the help given by the
federal government in the wake of Katrina included: deploying more than
74. NRP, supra note 14, at 69.
75. Id.
76. See id. at ESF #8-1.
77. See id. This support is categorized into the following areas: assessment of
health/medical needs; health surveillance; medical care personnel; health/medical equipment
and supplies; patient evacuation; in-hospital care; food/drug/medical device safety; worker
health/safety; all-hazard consultation; mental health care; public health information; vector
control; potable water/wastewater and solid waste disposal; victim identification/mortuary
services; and veterinary services. Id. at ESF #8-6.
78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
79. See TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 46.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 47.
82. Id. at 105.
83. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HURRICANE KATRINA: WHAT GOVERNMENT IS
DOING,
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/katrina.htm
[hereinafter
What
Government Is Doing] (providing a complete list of assistance given by federal departments
and agencies as of February 28, 2006).
84. See What Government is Doing, supra note 79.
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72,000 unified federal personnel; housing approximately 89,400 people in
shelters nationwide; completing roughly 55,000 housing damage
inspections; rescuing more than 33,000 lives; restoring more than 73% of
affected drinking water systems in Louisiana and 78% in Mississippi; and
serving more than 12 million hot meals and more than 8.2 million snacks to
survivors.85 These federal actions and the implementation of policies and
programs under the NRP demonstrate the strong level of commitment and
involvement by the federal government in preparation for and response to
catastrophic public health emergencies.86
This effort exemplifies the federal government’s potential for and
commitment to comprehensive disaster relief. The federal government has
huge and diverse resources that state and local governments will simply not
be able to access without the federal government during a catastrophic
event. Accordingly, states must plan for a response to such an event with
an eye toward the federal government. They should be aware of the
substantial assistance the federal government can provide and be prepared
to advise the federal government specifically of the role the state wants it
to play. Generalized requests like Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux
Blanco’s now famous plea, “I am going to need all the help you can send
me,”87 are unhelpful and may provoke the kind of floundering we saw from
the federal government during Katrina. If states do not properly
acknowledge the federal government’s resources and powers in their
disaster planning in this post-Katrina environment, they may find federal
preemption of their authority. Only such an acknowledgement will ensure
a healthy balance between the state and federal role during a catastrophic
public health emergency.
The White House February 2006 self-evaluation, The Federal Response
to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, acknowledges once again that, in
the future, the federal government will aggressively assert its responder
role in national public health catastrophes with nationwide consequences.88
It requires DHS to act promptly to implement its “Interim National
Preparedness Goal” to develop a National Preparedness System, i.e., to
develop “integrated plans, procedures, training, and capabilities at all levels
of government,”89 by “establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of
[f]ederal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and
85. See What Government is Doing, supra note 79; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
HOMELESSNESS, IN WASHINGTON: FEDERAL AGENCIES MAKE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AND
WAIVERS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THOSE AFFECTED BY HURRICANE KATRINA,
http://www.ich.gov/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
86. See supra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
87. See Lipton, et al., supra note 2.
88. See Lessons Learned, supra note 6.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
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outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of [f]ederal,
[s]tate, and local entities.”90 Lessons Learned also introduces the concept
of a National Operations Center (NOC).91 The NOC would operate as a
super-coordinating center, “integrat[ing] the national response and
provid[ing] a common operating picture for the entire [f]ederal
government.”92 It would “ensure [n]ational-level coordination of [f]ederal,
[s]tate, and local response to major domestic incidents.”93 Yet Lessons
Learned also recognizes that a much more aggressive approach from the
federal government, and even possibly a takeover of a response effort, may
be necessary during catastrophic events:
. . . [T]he response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that our current
system is too reactive in orientation. Our decades-old system, built on
the precepts of federalism, has been based on a model whereby local and
[s]tate governments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources
before requesting [f]ederal assistance. Federal agencies could and did
take steps to prepare to extend support and assistance, but tended to
provide little without a prior and specific request. In other words, the
system was biased toward requests and the concept of “pull” rather than
toward anticipatory actions and the proactive “push” of [f]ederal
resources.94

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the federal government is taking great strides in its
recognition of the need for coordination between the various levels of
government during a catastrophic public health emergency.
It is
undisputed that states and localities have primary responsibility over public
health emergencies, pursuant to their constitutional police powers.
90. Press Release, The White House, December 17, 2003 Homeland Security
Presidential
Directive/Hspd-8
(Dec.
17,
2003)
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html.
91. See TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 69.
92. Id.
93. Id. The White House proposal to create the NOC outside of the framework of DHS
appears to contemplate the transfer of federal “response” leadership away from DHS. Id. at
69-70. This leadership is expressly granted to DHS in the NRP. See, e.g., NRP, supra note
14, at 9. Lessons Learned does not clearly indicate to what part of the federal government
this leadership will be transferred. However, one can fairly assume that because the White
House drafted Lessons Learned, this leadership would transfer back to the White House, in
the form of its domestic security advisor, who was the principal author of Lessons Learned.
Ironically, this schema mirrors the leadership structure as it was prior to the creation of
DHS, when Governor Ridge coordinated the federal efforts before he became Secretary of
Homeland Security. See Press Release, The White House, Executive Order Establishing
Office
of
Homeland
Security
(Oct.
8,
2001),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html. Wherever the federal
leadership resides, it is critical that federal leadership is skillfully deployed. See Editorial,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at A14 (“If there’s one thing that Hurricane Katrina has taught
us, it is that just shuffling the bureaucratic deck does not make us safer.”).
94. See TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 66.
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Catastrophic public health emergencies that are aptly deemed incidents of
national significance, such as Katrina and potentially a pandemic flu
outbreak, are important exceptions to this rule. If deployed as intended, the
NRP, as supplemented by the recommendations of the Lessons Learned
self-evaluation, addresses these exceptions without destroying the rule.
When DHS labels a catastrophe an “incident of national significance,” it is
not an immediate call for a federal takeover of disaster relief. In fact, what
the NRP contemplates by examining its recommended incident command
structures is a coordinated, high-level, real time federal communication
with states and localities that in the best of circumstances would encourage
a coordinated and collaborated effort deploying federal assets as a
supplement to state and local supervision of an emergency response.95
Only in a worst-case scenario would the federal government find it
necessary to takeover a relief effort. To avoid the latter result, states must
fully comprehend the massive power of the federal government to act in
such a fashion that makes it a supportive ally, rather than upending the
states’ lead in the response.

95. NRP, supra note 14, at 29-30.

